People say they enjoy both seeing a preferred social group succeed and seeing an adversary social group fail. At the same time, they state they dislike seeing a preferred social group fail and seeing an adversary social group succeed. The current magnetic resonance imaging study investigated whether-and if so, how-such similarities in reported feeling states are reflected in neural activities. American football fans anticipated success and failure situations for their favorite or their adversary teams. The data support the idea that feeling similarities and divergences expressed in verbal reports carry with them significant neural similarities and differences, respectively. Desired (favorite team likely to win and adversary team likely to lose) rather than undesired (favorite team likely to lose and adversary team likely to win) outcomes were associated with heightened activity in the supramarginal gyrus, posterior cingulate cortex, insula, and cerebellum. Precuneus activity additionally distinguished anticipated desirable outcomes for favorite versus adversary teams.
Introduction
I support two teams: the All Blacks, and whoever is playing against Australia.
This famous slogan among supporters of New Zealand rugby describes a phenomenon that is the rule rather than the exception in sports competitions. Along these lines, soccer fans have been observed to experience Schadenfreude (also called malicious joy or malicious pleasure) when an adversary soccer team loses (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003) . Across a variety of sports settings, the favorite team winning (losing) and the adversary team losing (winning) are said to provoke similar feelings. Evidently, both success and failure can provoke feelings of pleasure or pain, depending on who is experiencing these outcomes. Something positive happening to our beloved can be as delightful as something negative happening to our enemies.
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The above-described rugby example refers to social situations that are associated with a similar subjective feeling state, yet differ remarkably with respect to the hedonic valence of the team in question (favorite vs. adversary), as well as with respect to the hedonic valence of the outcome (success vs. failure). Both the favorite team and the fact of winning a game per se have pleasant connotations. Conversely, both the adversary team and the fact of losing a game have unpleasant connotations. The resulting feeling state can then be defined as a combined function of team valence and outcome valence. It is thus the situated social meaning of success and failure that makes the experience good or bad.
In the sports context as much as in other social contexts, both the favorite team winning and the adversary team losing are desirable because both can improve the standing of one's own group with respect to rivals and thus serve a similar goal (Taijfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971) . The standing of the social group one identifies with is an important component of one's social identity and might significantly contribute to personal self-esteem (Hogg & Abrams, 1990; J. C. Turner & Onorato, 1999 E-mail address: tatjana.aue@unige.ch 1 Throughout this article, I make no strong distinction between actual outcomes and anticipation of those outcomes (e.g., Schadenfreude vs. anticipated Schadenfreude) because a close correspondence is assumed between (the neural signatures of) feeling states related to anticipated outcomes and those related to real outcomes. First, the literature has revealed that people are capable of using their anticipated feeling states related to imagined outcomes for efficient decision (footnote continued) making and that the circuits underlying the mediation of anticipated feeling states and associated decisions rely on the recall (i.e., the reactivation) of earlier real experiences (e.g., somatic marker hypothesis; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Damasio, 1994) . Second, it has been shown for laboratory experiments that there is a close correspondence between anticipated pleasure and actual pleasure in response to imagined and real outcomes, respectively (Mellers, 2000) .
